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t its August 12, 2003, meeting, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) took the unusual
step of foreshadowing its future policy course
by announcing that its current highly accommodative
monetary policy could “be maintained for a considerable
period.” Although the FOMC did not specify the length
of the “considerable period,” the change in federal funds
rate futures contracts suggested that market observers
interpreted the language to be a commitment by the FOMC
that it would not increase its target level of the federal
funds rate for at least six months, perhaps longer. The
FOMC repeated this language in the press releases follow-
ing its subsequent three meetings.
The FOMC’s August minutes note that they made this
unconventional policy commitment, with the federal funds
target rate already at the “quite accommodative” level of
1 percent, “to encourage progress toward closing the econ-
omy’s currently wide output gap and, with inflation already
near the low end of what some members regarded as an
acceptable range, to resist significant further disinflation.”
Because spending decisions are more closely linked to
the behavior of longer-term rates, to achieve this goal the
FOMC appears to have made this unconventional commit-
ment so as to reduce long-term interest rates in the absence
of further reductions in the federal funds rate target.
Even if longer-term rates are determined in large part
by market expectations for future short-term rates, it is
difficult to know how changes in monetary policy will
affect longer-term nominal interest rates. The effect of
monetary policy on longer-term rates is complicated by
the fact that observed long-term nominal rates comprise
three unobserved components—the real rate, the inflation
compensation, and a premium for inflation uncertainty.
Consequently, longer-term rates need not fall when mone-
tary policy eases, whether the easier policy comes in the
form of a reduction in the overnight rate target or by an
unconventional commitment to extend the duration of a
low target rate for a time period longer than suggested
by historical experience. 
While an apparently easier policy might reduce one
component, such as the real rate, it might simultaneously
increase the level of or uncertainty associated with expec-
tations of future inflation. For example, despite widely
publicized decreases in actual inflation, longer-term
nominal rates have decreased by substantially less, since
January 2001, than the FOMC’s 550-basis-point reduction
in the federal funds rate.
Economists often look at the market for inflation-
indexed government bonds when they seek to separate
changes in longer-term nominal rates into their real and
expected inflation components. The figure tracks the 
10-year constant-maturity yields on Treasury nominal
and inflation-indexed securities since the August publica-
tion of the “considerable period” language. The generally
downward drift of the TIIS yield suggests that the FOMC’s
unconventional language might, in fact, have reduced real
long-term interest rates. At the same time, the essentially
unchanged nominal 10-year yield suggests that the decrease
in the real-rate component has been matched by either 
an increase in inflation compensation or the inflation-
uncertainty premium. It remains an open question whether
this unconventional policy will cause the output gap to
close more quickly.
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